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Generic utilization rates have risen substantially since the enactment of The Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman) in 1984. In the year Hatch-Waxman was enacted,
generic utilization rates were 19 percent; in contrast, today, the generic utilization rate is approximately
70 percent. Striking a balance between access to existing medicines and access to yet-to-be-discovered
(and developed) drugs, through research incentives, was the principal objective of this landmark legislation.
However, given the current rate of generic utilization, it seems plausible, if not likely, that any balance
achieved by the 1984 Act has since shifted away from research incentives and towards improved access,
ceteris paribus. Among other factors, recent mandatory substitution laws in most states have driven
up generic utilization rates. In the current paper, we employ semi-annual data from 1992 to 2008 to
examine the link between generic utilization rates and real U.S. prescription drug prices. This link
is important because previous research has identified a causal relationship between real drug prices
in the U.S. and industry-level R&D investment intensity. We identify a statistically significant, positive
relationship between generic utilization rates in the U.S. and real U.S. prescription drug prices. Specifically,
we estimate an elasticity of real drug prices to generic utilization rates of -0.15. This finding, when
coupled with previous empirical work on the determinants of pharmaceutical R&D intensity, suggests
an elasticity of R&D to generic utilization rates of about 0.090. While the magnitude of this elasticity
is modest, as theory would predict—the effect of greater generic erosion of brand sales at patent expiration
is heavily discounted due to the long time horizon to generic erosion when an R&D project is in clinical
development.  However, because there has been a very substantial increase in generic utilization rates
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I.  Introduction 
 
Since the enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act), the share of all U.S. prescriptions that are filled 
with generic drugs has increased substantially: from 19 percent in 1984 to 69 percent in 2008 
(GPhA, 2009; PhRMA 2007 Annual Report; IMS Health Reports Press Release, March 12, 
2008).  See figure 1 below.  Hatch-Waxman greatly facilitated  generic entry by significantly 
lowering the associated  costs of bringing a generic drug to market,  and continues to do so 
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1986; 1992). Instead of replicating the same long, costly, and risky 
clinical trials already undertaken by the brand manufacturer to gain FDA approval under a New 
Drug Application (NDA), generic firms need only show bioequivalence with the off-patent drug 
as part of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). The cost savings to generic 
manufacturers have been substantial. The time from discovery to market launch for a new brand 
drug has been recently estimated between ten and 15 years and costs in excess of $1 billion 
(DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 2003; Vernon, Golec, and DiMasi, 2010). In contrast, it costs 
only $1-2 million for a generic manufacturer to demonstrate bioequivalence to a branded drug 
(Saha, Grabowski, and Birnbaum, et al., 2006). As one would expect, the increased ease of 
generic approvals has been associated with significant growth in the generic pharmaceutical 
industry. Over the past two decades, the generic industry’s revenues have grown from $1 billion 
to $63 billion. 4 
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For branded manufacturers, while Hatch-Waxman also contains provisions for patent-
term restoration (e.g., extending the patent length to account for the time it takes the FDA to 
review and approve a new branded drug), there has also been a sharp rise in clinical development 
costs (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 2003; Grabowski, 2003). This increase in costs results 
from a greater number of clinical trials, which are larger and more complex than they were in 
1984, to compete effectively and to meet FDA requirements. For example, data compiled by the 
Tuft’s Center for the Study of Drug Development (DiMasi, 2003)  estimates  that  the mean 
number of subjects in clinical trials per NDA has risen more than four-fold, from 1,312 in 1984 
to 5,621 in 2000. Also, clinical trial complexity is estimated to have increased by more than 40 
percent between 1992 and 2000  (DataEdge, 2002).  As a result, much of Hatch-Waxman’s 
innovation incentives via patent restoration, balanced with enhanced generic competition, have 
                                                            
1 Source: AARP Public Policy Institute: assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/i16_generics.pdf    5 
 
arguably been eroded, and the balance originally struck by the 1984 Act has thus likely shifted as 
expected returns to R&D have declined, ceteris paribus. See, for example, Cook (1998).
2
The concomitant effect on drug prices and branded drug revenues has also been striking. 
A very recent study found, for example, that in the case of a large brand product, generic entry 
and price competition will come swiftly (it may take only few years for a generic pharmaceutical 
to be ready for product launch); moreover, in cases where there are between 10 and 20 generic 
competitors entering the market, generic prices can be driven down to marginal production cost 
within a few months (Saha, Grabowski, Birnbaum, et al, 2006). One significant cause of this may 
be the dramatic increase in the level of generic utilization (as shown in figure 1 it has increased 
from 19 percent to 69 percent). For example, once Pfizer’s Lipitor (generic name atorvastatin) 




During much of the R&D phase of drug development, patent expiration is many years 
off; thus, the price erosion from any generic entry is discounted over many years. Nevertheless, 
the  magnitude of the  increase in generic utilization and the associated impact on real 
pharmaceutical prices is not trivial. This is particularly true for the more costly later-stage R&D 
projects and Phase IV research because generic entry is much closer on the horizon. 
Furthermore,  for  patented products brought in to compete against other brands in the  same 
therapeutic drug class, they too, will face a shorter period of time on the market before generic 
entry into the class.  
 
                                                            
2 Cook (1998), p. 50 (“CBO's analysis has found that the patent extensions available under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
were not sufficient to fully preserve the returns from marketing new brand-name drugs.”) 
3 Lipitor sales in 2008 are reported to be $5.9 billion in the US. See http://www.drugs.com/top200.html  6 
 
Generic entry can increase generic utilization in different ways. Generic utilization is a 
general measure of the use of generics and their prevalence in the market. It can increase either 
because of higher generic penetration (i.e., a greater percentage of drugs for which there is a 
generic version available) or because generics capture greater shares of markets that have already 
experienced  generic entry.  Higher generic penetration in the U.S. was reported in a 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study in 1998,
4 and more recently by Aitken, Berndt, and 
Cutler (2009).
5  In addition to increasing the frequency of any given brand facing generic 
competition, enhanced generic entry can increase the intensity of generic competition by 
expanding the number of generic competitors. Research by Reiffen and Ward (2005) and Saha, 
Grabowski, Birnbaum  et al.  (2006)  helps  illuminate the effect of increasing the number of 
generic entrants on generic market share and prices. Saha, Grabowski, Birnbaum, et al. (2006), 
for example, report that the generic market share was about 79 percent where there were 20 or 
more suppliers in the first year, as opposed to 47 percent where there were only a few.
6
More generally, factors that enhance generic competition can lead to increases in generic 
utilization and an accompanying reduction in the expected profitability of existing and future 
R&D projects for a new branded product. In addition to the reduced costs to gain FDA approval, 
we note that generic utilization can also increase as a result of state legislative efforts favoring 
generics (or even requiring them in some instances).  In general, the expected returns for a 
prospective new branded product will decrease if generic competition is either more likely or 
  
                                                            
4 See, e.g., Cook 1998, at p. xii (“Even more important, the act increased the proportion of brand-name drugs that 
face generic competition once their patents expire. In 1983, only 35 percent of the top-selling drugs with expired 
patents (excluding antibiotics and drugs approved before 1962) had generic versions available. Today, nearly all 
do.”).  
5 Aitken et al. (2009) at p. w156 (noting that the generic penetration rate increased from 77.3 percent in 2003 to 86.4 
percent in 2007). 
6 Saha et al (2006), pp. 15–38 (“The average market share a year after the first generic entry for compounds with at 
least 20 suppliers is 79 percent, while this share is only 47 percent for compounds with two or fewer generics.”). 7 
 
more intense, as either effect tends to decrease expected future revenues. Of course, a branded 
firm may be able to mitigate these effects to a modest extent using an authorized generic to 
compete for a share of the generic market revenues.  According to the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) interim report on authorized generics, an authorized generic may expect to 
capture roughly half the generic market revenues when competing against a single ANDA 
generic.
7
Scherer (2001) found a persistent relationship between pharmaceutical gross margins and 
R&D expenditures. More recently, Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005) found that lagged real 
U.S. pharmaceutical prices are an important determinant of industry-level R&D investment 
intensity (R&D expenditures as a percent of pharmaceutical sales revenues). This was argued to 
be the case because real pharmaceutical prices capture expectations of future prices, the degree 
of favorable overall market conditions,  and profitability,  as well as serving as a proxy for 
internally-generated  cash flows.  Since Grabowski’s seminal paper on  the determinants of 
industrial research and development (Grabowski, 1968), numerous subsequent  studies  have 
found a similar, and largely consistent, positive relationship between internally-generated cash 
flows and pharmaceutical R&D intensity (Grabowski and Vernon, 1981, 2000; Scherer, 1996; 
Vernon, 2005; Vernon, Golec, Lutter, et al, 2009; Golec, Hegde, and Vernon, 2010). Capital 
market imperfections result in a divergence between the cost of capital for internal funds and the 
cost of capital for external funds (debt and equity), with the latter being more costly.  
  However, the  authorized generics’  price (and,  thus, its revenues) will typically  be 
discounted significantly relative to the brand. 
                                                            
7 U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2009) “Authorized Generics: An Interim Report,” p. 3 (“Revenues of a sole 
ANDA generic company during the180-day exclusivity period drop substantially with AG entry, with estimates of 
the average decline ranging from 47 percent to 51 percent.”) 8 
 
It  follows, therefore,  that increased generic utilization  in the U.S.  will affect real 
pharmaceutical prices in the U.S., and based on the discussion above, also R&D investment 
intensity. However, due to the construction of the real drug price index, as discussed more fully 
later, there is an empirical question as to the magnitude of the effect that generic utilization will 
have on the price index. We seek to answer this question in the current paper. We do this by 
estimating the relationship between generic utilization rates in the U.S. and real pharmaceutical 
prices, also in the U.S.,  and then mapping this mechanical relationship into the model of 
pharmaceutical R&D investment intensity estimated in Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005). 
Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon estimated an elasticity of pharmaceutical R&D intensity to real 
U.S. pharmaceutical prices of 0.583, implying that for every 10 percent increase (decrease) in 
real pharmaceutical prices in the U.S., R&D intensity increases (decreases) by 5.83 percent. This 
is consistent with a similar elasticity estimate by Scherer (1996) of 0.61. By combining our 
findings on the impact of generic utilization rates on real U.S. pharmaceutical prices, with the 
aforementioned elasticity of R&D intensity to real U.S. pharmaceutical prices, we can measure 
the relationship between R&D intensity and generic utilization rates, the principal goal of our 
paper. 
The rest of our paper will proceed as follows. Section II will introduce the theoretical 
model and discuss how generic utilization rates erode incentives for brand manufacturers. 
Section III will describe and discuss our data. Section IV will present our empirical results and 
discuss their implications. This section will also map our empirical findings on the link between 
generic utilization rates and real U.S. drug prices into the former’s impact on R&D investment 
intensity. Section IV will conclude and offer suggestions for future research.   9 
 
II.  Theoretical Model of  R&D Investment and Generic Drug Utilization Rates 
             
  To demonstrate the effect that increased generic utilization rates in the U.S. can have on 
the incentives to invest in pharmaceutical R&D we present a simple model in which firms make 
their R&D project investment decisions using the expected net present value (NPV) criterion and 
an R&D project’s internal rate of return (IRR).  
While increasing generic utilization rates can affect R&D project investment decisions at 
all stages in development, we focus our attention on later-stage R&D investment decisions, when 
generic competition will have the greatest affect on a project’s  expected  NPV.  Firms make 
development decisions by estimating expected net cash flows (Ct), which are after-tax, expected 
net revenues for the years a drug is expected to be on the market and after-tax, R&D-related, 
cash flows during the R&D project’s developmental  (and approval) stages.  Thus, we can 



















































=   (1)
 
 
  In equation (1), r  is an  R&D project’s cost of capital (assumed to be constant for 
expositional convenience) and T is the last year for which the R&D project, at this point a 
marketed product, is expected to generate cash flows. The effect of increased generic utilization 
rates on firm profits and cash flows is theoretically unambiguous. The magnitude of this effect, 
however, depends on numerous factors, such as the length of time until patent expiration (for the 
developmental drug or any same-therapeutic-class drug that faces patent expiration at an earlier 
date) or the degree of substitutability and the date of patent expiration for products in other 
therapeutic classes, as well as how the cost of financing R&D is affected by the availability and 10 
 
level  of i nternal f unds.  Figure 2   illustrates  how pr esent v alue  revenues de cline  with hi gher 
generic utilization rates.  
 
Figure 2: The Effect of Greater Generic Entry on Expected Cash Flows 
                         
                         
                         
                           
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                            
  Increased  generic uti lization  rates  (GURs)  clearly  have a n  impact  on  an  expected 
project’s NPV; however, the extent to which they have an impact is an empirical question. One 
thing is certain, since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, and the passage of 
legislation e ncouraging  and  mandating ge neric s ubstitution,  generic uti lization r ates ha ve 
climbed very significantly: from 19 percent in 1984 to 69 percent in today’s environment. Thus, 
the rate of return that a firm can expect to earn on its investors’ capital for its R&D projects has 
fallen, ceteris paribus. This reduces a firm’s profit-maximizing, or equilibrium, level of R&D 
investment.  We  illustrate thi s be low in  Figure  3,  where t he cr oss-hatched boxe s r eflect  the 
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utilization rate (High GUR) and low generic utilization rate (Low GUR), holding all other factors 
constant, of course. 
 
Figure 3: Equilibrium R&D Investment in the Presence of High and Low GURs  
 
 
Figure 3 depicts two different marginal efficiencies of R&D: one in the presence of low 
generic utilization rates (the higher schedule) and one in the presence of high generic utilization 
rates (the lower schedule). These schedules are derived by arranging potential R&D investment 
projects in a decreasing order with respect to each project’s expected internal rate of return. 
Firms will undertake the high return projects first,  and continue to undertake additional 
investment projects, so long as the expected rate of return from the next project exceeds the 
firm’s marginal cost of capital. This is the classic investment supply and demand framework.  
Increasing generic utilization rates shifts the marginal internal rate of return schedule 
down, and fewer R&D projects meet  the  E(NPV) > 0  investment  criterion,  of earning an 
expected rate of return in excess of the cost of capital associated with the R&D project. Investors 
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will not supply capital to fund those marginal projects whose internal rates of return fall below 
their required returns, and for internally-financed projects, the expected rate of return falls below 
the project’s opportunity cost of capital. Finally, figures 2 and 3 exclude the effects that internal 
cash flows have on capital supply to the firm. Capital market imperfections, perhaps due to 
transactions costs, tax advantages, asymmetric information, agency costs, or financial distress, 
may impart a cost advantage to financing R&D projects with internal cash flows instead of 
raising new capital from investors. Theoretical and empirical studies show that cash flows exert a 
positive influence on the level of firm investment spending (Malmendier and Tate 2005; Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Hall  1992; Hubbard  1998; Grabowski, 1968, Grabowski  and 
Vernon, 1981,  2000;  Scherer 2001; Vernon  2005; Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon  2005; 
Vernon, Golec, Lutter, et al., 2009; Golec, Hegde, and Vernon, 2010). Reduced cash flows from 
greater generic utilization reduce, ceteris paribus, the brand firm’s level of internal cash flows, 
which reduces the equilibrium level of R&D investment.  
Having illustrated and discussed the ways in which increasing generic utilization rates 
will reduce the expected IRR of a firm’s R&D projects, thereby lowering the expected profit 
maximizing  level of R&D  intensity, we now turn to the  theoretical model employed by 
Grabowski and Vernon (1981, 2000); Vernon (2005); Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005), 
and Vernon, Golec, Lutter (2009), upon which our current empirical model is also based. 
First, consider the following equilibrium condition for the level of pharmaceutical R&D 
expenditures: 
 
f(X, Y, R) = h(Z, R)                  (2) 
 13 
 
In equation (2): X is a vector of variables influencing the expected costs of an R&D 
project (e.g., clinical development costs, marketing costs, etc.); Y is a vector of variables 
influencing the expected revenues from the R&D project (e.g. real U.S. drug prices or generic 
utilization rates); Z is a vector of variables influencing the firm’s cost of capital (e.g., the level of 
cash flows if market imperfections exist in the capital markets for pharmaceutical R&D; and, R 
is the level of R&D expenditures.  Solving equation (2) for R yields the equilibrium level 
(expected-profit-maximizing level) of R&D expenditures: 
 
R
*= g(X, Y, Z)                  (3) 
 
This is the reduced form equation for equilibrium R&D investment.  To obtain our 
estimate of the elasticity of R&D intensity to generic utilization rates, we will build directly off 
of the empirical findings from Giaccotto, Santerre, Vernon (2005), who estimated the elasticity 
of R&D intensity to real U.S. drug prices to be 0.583. This elasticity measure is approximately 
equal to a similar empirical estimate by Scherer (1996) of 0.61, and is generally plausible.
8 Real 
U.S. drug prices, which formed the key variable in the Y vector of equations (2) and (3) in 
Giaccotto, Santerre, Vernon (2005), are influenced by the rate of generic utilization. The reason 
why increases in generic utilization influence the index of drug prices is primarily a result of how 
generic drugs are introduced into the index. When a generic enters the index, the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) will replace the price of a branded drug with the price of its generic 
equivalent, leading to a large drop in the price of that drug in the index.
9
                                                            
8 Here the pharmaceutical CPI was used rather than the PPI. This was because PPI data were not available for the 
full time series used in the paper by Gianccotto, Santerre and Vernon (2005). To link to the results in that paper, we 
use the same price measure. 
 By marrying the 
9 See www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifact4.htm : “Six months after a drug in the sample loses patent protection, CPI field staff 
selects among all drugs (including the original) that the Food and Drug Administration deems to be therapeutically-14 
 
elasticity of R&D intensity to the real U.S. drug price, and the elasticity of the real drug price to 
generic utilization, we obtain our elasticity of R&D intensity to the generic utilization rate. We 




* = g[X, Y(GUR), Z(GUR)]               (4) 
 
In equation (4),  we show that expected future generic utilization rates  influence 
equilibrium R&D investment implicitly through the expected returns and cash flow variables in 
the Y and Z vectors. As previously discussed, the GUR will directly affect the real U.S. drug 
price index, and, as a result, expected future profitability and industry cash flows. We now turn 
to a description of our data and a more explicit specification of our empirical model. 
 
III.  Empirical Model Linking Generic Utilization Rates and Real Drug Prices 
 
On the basis of the preceding discussion and our conceptual model depicted in equation 
4, we specify, in equation 5, a reduced form model of how the generic utilization rate (GUR) 
influences real pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. For consistency, we maintain the same measure 
of real drug prices used in Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005), and specify it as a function of 
the  generic utilization rate and other variables  that may affect real drug prices.  As with 
Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005), there is a high degree of serial correlation in our time 
series data, and we require second differencing to remove it—in order to avoid the econometric 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
equivalent. Delaying the reselection for six months allows emerging generic drugs an opportunity to gain market 
share… If a generic is selected, the CPI treats any price difference between the original drug and its selected 
substitute as a price change, and reflects this change in the index in the month when the procedure was performed.” 15 
 
difficulties associated with non-stationary processes.
10
1 β
 We also logarithmically transform our 
levels variables; hence, our coefficient estimates are interpretable as elasticities, with   in 
equation (5) serving as an approximation of the elasticity of real U.S. drug price to the generic 
utilization rate. Because the data we have on generic utilization rates come from IMS, which 
only has these data going back to 1992, we are not able to re-estimate the model in Giaccotto, 
Santerre, and Vernon (2005)  directly, which relied on annual data from  1953 to 2001.  Our 
model, therefore,  uses data between 1992 and 2008.  We  specify the following model using 
semiannual data (where Δ represents second differencing): 
 
) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 3 2 1 1 0 t t t t GDP UE GUR P ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − β β β β       (5) 
 
In equation (5), Pt is the U.S. prescription drug consumer price index (RxCPI) divided by 
the, general U.S. consumer price index (CPI), as defined and measured by the BLS. The GURt 
variable is measured by the share of total prescriptions accounted for by generic prescriptions in 
the IMS Health’s National Prescription Audit database. The variables UEt and GDPt are controls, 
and are described shortly.  
In measuring the RxCPI, the BLS only registers a change due to generic entry six months 
after a generic comes on the market. At this point, the BLS may substitute the price of the 
branded drug with the price of its generic equivalent if the generic version has captured a large 
share of the brand  drug’s sales.  Thus, based on the way BLS constructs the  RxCPI, it is 
appropriate to lag the generic utilization rate by 6 months (or one period in this model). Given 
                                                            
10 Dickey-Fuller test statistics is -6.2 on second differenced log of drug prices and -10.2 on second differenced 
lagged log of generic utilization.  16 
 
this six month structure in the index for generic entry, the most sensible approach was to use a 
period of six months (or semi-annually). This left us with 27 observations for the analysis. 
The other explanatory variables included are: the unemployment rate (UEt), as measured 
by the BLS, and real GDP (GDPt), all in 2000 dollars.
11
 
 The results of the model described in 
equation (5) are presented in Table 1 below: 
Table 1: Regression Results Explaining Real U.S. Drug Prices 
 








Error  t-Stat  p value 
         
Intercept  -0.0015  0.0011  -1.29  0.208 
GUR ln ∆   -0.1506  0.0716  -2.10  0.047 
UE ln ∆    0.0724  0.0224   3.23  0.004 
GDP ln ∆    0.4088  0.1602   2.55  0.018 
Number of Observations = 27       
Adj R-squared = 0.3782       
Durbin Watson Statistic = 1.8       
 
  As shown in table 1, and as expected, the generic utilization rate has a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with real drug prices.
12
                                                            
11 We also ran a larger specification of the model that included the following additional variables: (1) the share of 
the population covered by health insurance (HI) as measured by the census bureau; (2) monthly drug expenditures in 
dollars (RX), available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) National Economic Accounts database; (3) a 
measure of drug innovation (IN), defined as the share of new FDA drug application approvals accounted for by new 
chemical entities (data from the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research), and (4) the measure of the US 
population (Pop) taken from the Census.. However, none of these variables was statistically significant and the 
results were qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar.  
  The coefficient estimate of -0.15 
indicates that with a 10 percent increase (decrease) in the utilization rate, there will be a 1.5 
percent decrease (increase) in real drug prices. The two control variables included in the model 
12 Newey-West standard errors generate the same conclusions. 17 
 
also had statistically significant coefficient estimates. An increase in the unemployment rate is 
positively correlated with real drug prices. Because real drug prices are a ratio of drug prices and 
the CPI, this result may be picking up a historical relationship between unemployment and the 
CPI. It may also reflect persistent purchases by unemployed patients that no longer have access 
to relatively advantageous prices for drugs.
13
 
 Finally, GDP is also positively correlated with real 
drug prices (indicating that GDP pushes drug prices up more quickly than overall consumer 
prices). 
IV.  The Relationship between Increased Generic Utilization and R&D.  
 
There are two primary mechanisms by which increased generic utilization reduces the 
equilibrium level of R&D investment: a cash-flow effect and an expected-returns effect. As to 
the first, many firms have portfolios of products on the market at, or near, patent expiration. 
Generic entry into these markets has an immediate impact on firm cash flows. As to the second, 
greater generic entry at patent expiration reduces the expected returns to investments in current 
R&D projects. This effect will be greater the farther along an R&D project is in the development 
process, as generic erosion will have a greater expected present value impact on expected returns 
for these projects
14
                                                            
13 Note, the model without unemployment also produces a statistically and economically significant coefficient for 
the generic utilization rate of similar magnitude (-0.12). 
.  Note  that products in the same therapeutic class are  subject to generic 
erosion at the expiration of the first-in-class product’s patent expiration. Also, to the extent there 
is off-label use of the relevant products, generic erosion can also affect expected returns to 
14 This is particularly true given the well-known fact that a project’s cost of capital is not constant, but rather higher, 
on average, the earlier it is in product development; thus resulting in even steeper discounting of future cash flows 
for earlier-stage R&D projects. 18 
 
products in different therapeutic classes. The literature has identified these two determinants, 
current cash flows and expected returns on future products, as the key variables influencing 
equilibrium R&D intensity. As shown previously in figure 3, increased generic utilization rates 
will shift the marginal efficiency of R&D (the demand for R&D) to the left, resulting in a lower 
level of equilibrium R&D expenditures. 
  A primary research objective in the current paper is to estimate the elasticity of R&D 
intensity with respect to the generic utilization rate.  To this end,  we rely on the  estimated 
elasticity of 0.583 for R&D intensity with respect to the real U.S. pharmaceutical price obtained 
by Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005), and our empirical results from table 1. We may 
express the elasticity measure we seek as a function of these two variables as follows (where 
j i, ε is the elasticity of i with respect to j): 
GUR RD GUR P P RD , , , ε ε ε = ×                 (6) 
Our estimate of the elasticity of real drug prices to generic utilization rates is -0.1506, as 
shown in table 1. The coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05-level for a two-tail test and at 
the 0.01-level for a one-tail test. Using  equation  (6),  it is straight forward to calculate the 
elasticity of R&D intensity with respect to generic utilization rates in the U.S. This elasticity is 
estimated to be -0.088 (the product of the previously estimated elasticity of R&D intensity to 
drug prices, 0.583,  and our current estimate of the elasticity of real  drug prices to generic 
utilization,  -0.1506).  This suggests  that  for every 10 percent increase (decrease) in generic 
utilization rates, R&D intensity decreases (increases) 0.88  percent, or, slightly less than  1 
percent. This magnitude seems quite plausible in light of the significant amount of discounting 19 
 
(due to long time horizons) of the revenue shares captured by generics, and associated with 
greater generic utilization rates, at patent expiration. However, this modestly-sized elasticity, 
when considered alongside the significant increase in generic utilization rates in the U.S., from 
19 percent in 1984 to 69 percent in 2008, suggests the effect on R&D investment is far from 
trivial. For example, measuring the percentage change in the generic utilization rate as 0.50/0.44, 
where 0.44 = 0.50(0.19+0.69), implies a 114 percent increase in the generic utilization rate, and 
hence an associated 10 percent decline in R&D intensity. Based on previous analyses of the 
social welfare benefits associated with pharmaceutical R&D investment, the present value cost 
of a 10  percent  decline in R&D investment could be very significant (Lichtenberg, 2002; 
Vernon, 2004). The benefits to consumers of lower U.S. drug prices, via increased generic 
utilization, would need to be weighed simultaneously with the long-term costs associated with 
diminished rates of pharmaceutical innovation.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
Our analyses in this paper provide a measure of the relationship  between generic 
utilization rates and real pharmaceutical prices, in the U.S. Further, relying on prior research, we 
also measure the relationship between generic utilization rates and R&D investment intensity. 
We have been able to demonstrate a negative relationship between the level of generic drug 
utilization in the U.S. and real U.S. pharmaceutical prices. Our results, when coupled with prior 
research,  are consistent with the expectation, implied by theory, of  higher levels of generic 
utilization  in the U.S. resulting in  lower levels of profit-maximizing, equilibrium R&D 
investment intensity. The primary drivers underlying this relationship are the aforementioned 20 
 
effects generic utilization rates have on cash flows (the primary source of funds for R&D due to 
their lower cost of capital relative to debt and equity) and expected returns to pharmaceutical 
R&D investment.  
Since the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 attempted to balance drug innovation and generic 
competition, utilization rates have risen from 19 percent to  approximately 70 percent.  An 
important question is whether or not the Hatch-Waxman Act initially (and subsequently—i.e., 
today), achieved (achieves) the right balance. Previous research by the CBO suggests that there 
has been an imbalance, see, e.g., Cook (1998). Moreover, research by Murphy and Topel (2003) 
and Lichtenberg (2002), suggests that, based on contributions to life expectancy and quality of 
life, medical and pharmaceutical R&D are likely to be at inefficiently low levels.   
Of course, markets change over time and some of the imbalance may be an unintended 
consequence. While research and development costs have increased, so too has spending on 
pharmaceuticals. Greater levels of generic drug utilization, new laws and policies, changing FDA 
approval requirements, and the evolution of science have all contributed to a very different 
pharmaceutical market.   
  The results in this paper provide an important input to any balancing of the benefits of 
access to existing medicines and the costs of foregone innovation.  While it is difficult to assess 
this balance, it seems likely that over the last three decades, the growth of generic utilization has 
shifted toward access, at some cost in innovation. Specifically, generic utilization rates since 
Hatch-Waxman have grown 50 percentage points: from 19 percent to 69 percent. This is 
approximately a 114 percent increase. Based on the results in this paper, this would imply, 21 
 
ceteris paribus, that R&D intensity has declined by about 10 percent.
15
 
 These results not only 
help to diagnose an imbalance, but also provide a start on moving forward towards a remedy. 
Future research that can reasonably measure both the costs and benefits of changing market 
structures, institutional changes (e.g. FDA policies and approval requirements), and proposed 
new regulations, will be of much value to the extent it can inform and shape public policy, in an 
effort to minimize the sum of static (short-run) inefficiency costs and dynamic (long-run) 
inefficiency costs—thus striking an economically efficient balance between access to existing 














                                                            
15 1.14*0.088 is approximately 0.10. Note, this should not be interpreted as a measurement of the impact of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act on R&D, which would require an assumption that—but for the Act—the generic utilization rate 
would still be 19 percent, and we do not have a measure of how different the generic utilization rate would have 
been in the absence of the Act. Moreover, such questions are beyond the scope of this paper.  22 
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